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A CONCLUDING COMMENT 
John Hick 
I am grateful to the Editor for his invitation to write a comment on the papers 
in this issue. I only have the space, and the time, to do so in a highly selective 
and discriminatory way, taking up some of the points made about the pluralistic 
hypothesis, which seems to me to constitute the most hopeful approach to an 
interpretation of the facts of religious diversity. 
Robert McKim distinguishes usefully between what he calls moderate and 
radical pluralism, and rightly identifies my own position as a form of moderate 
pluralism. That is to say, the hypothesis that seems to me to account best, from 
a religious point of view, for the history of religions holds that what McKim 
calls the Religious Reality is known to human beings through their religious 
experience, and that this is formed jointly by the universal presence to us of that 
Reality and the different sets of concepts and spiritual practices developed by 
the world's religious traditions. In the case of those exceptionally vivid moments 
of religious experience that are called mystical, this analysis is easy to accept. 
The content of such experiences is manifestly tradition-specific. A Roman Cath-
olic may see a vision of the Virgin Mary but will not see one of Krishna; a 
Protestant Christian may hear the voice of Jesus but will not hear the voice of 
Kali; and so on. One can of course take the naive realist view that Mary was 
(or was not) personally present to this person at this time and place, and Krishna 
to that person, and that Jesus was personally uttering to another person some 
particular words in, say, German. All this is possible. One could also, from a 
naturalistic point of view, regard all such experiences as purely hallucinatory. 
But the interpretation that seems to me most plausible and rationally acceptable 
from a religious point of view is that in such cases there is a heightened human 
openness to the Religious Reality, giving rise to a conscious experience whose 
concrete form is determined by the individual's training and expectations. And 
I suggest that the same general interpretation applies to the less vivid and the 
more gently pervasive forms of religious experience that occur in prayer or 
meditation, sacrament or scripture reading, or as a sense of the divine presence 
amid the beauties of nature or the immensities of space, or in moments of special 
exaltation or illumination, or at the times of birth and death .... These experi-
ences receive their character or meaning from religious concepts imbibed from 
our social milieu and linguistic community. 
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And so if we seek a religious, as distinguished from a naturalistic, interpretation 
of religion in its plurality of forms, it seems to me that we find it in the hypothesis 
of a transcendent Religious Reality which is variously conceived, and hence 
variously experienced, and hence variously responded to within the different 
religious cultures of the earth. 
From this point of view it is true to say that we do experience the Real. 
However, as with all other perceptions, we perceive it, not as it is in itself, 
unobserved, but as it is in its relation to the perceiver, with her or his particular 
conceptual equipment. This conceptual equipment includes both universal human 
elements and also an individual version of the distinctive conceptual system 
taught by one's religious tradition. We thus perceive the Real through the mental 
'lensc' of one of the great traditions, with their distinctive forms of spiritual 
practice, sets of ideas, formative stories and myths, and treasuries of inspirational 
literature. All that we can properly say about the Real an sich, according to this 
hypothesis, is that it is the ultimate ground of its varying manifestations to human 
consciousness. These consciousnesses, and the linguistic worlds which have 
formed them, supply the concepts that give structure and form to awareness of 
the Real. But the variety of these concepts is such that they cannot all characterize 
the Real in itself. It is of course possible that the ideas of some one particular 
tradition, say Christianity, accurately characterize the Real, which is accordingly 
a trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. It will follow that the Jewish, Muslim, 
Hindu, Buddhist and other conceptions of the Religious Reality are false. But 
suppose we accept that (as I have argued in my paper in this issue) so far as we 
can tcll the great world traditions are more or less equally effective contexts of 
salvific transformation. It will then follow that a tradition's conception of the 
Religious Reality makes no difference to its salvific effectiveness. But this would 
remove the religious point of a claim to a valid characterization of the Religious 
Reality. Would it not be more acceptable to suppose that these characterizations 
are salvifically important, but that what they characterize is not the Real in itself 
but different authentic manifestations of it to human life? 
It follows of course from this two-level hypothesis of a noumenal Real and 
its phenomenal manifestations that there can be no cult of the Real in itself. We 
do not worship the Real an sich but the Real as known to us as the Heavenly 
Father, or Allah, or Adonai, or Vishnu, or Shiva ... or in a self-transcending 
openness to Brahman or Nirvana, or Sunyata or the Dharmakaya .... But how 
then, McKim asks, can we understand the idea of divine activity in history, in 
providence, miracle, revelation, and answer to prayer? In the kind of way that 
many Christian theologians have come to understand them. A putative divine 
act is an earthly event experienced as mediating God's presence and purpose; a 
putative miracle is a remarkable happening experienced as a miracle; and a 
putative divine verbal revelation is an item of human language experienced as 
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divine revelation. Such modes of experiencing-as are integral to the Christian 
tradition (as well as to other traditions) and the tradition as a whole is, on the 
pluralistic hypothesis, an authentic human response to the Real. 
McKim asks how we can know that Christianity (or any other tradition) is an 
authentic response to the Real. The answer is circular, but is an instance of the 
kind of benign circle that all fundamental faith positions involve. We believe 
by faith that there is a transcendent divine Reality to which our religious tradition 
is a response. We believe this partly because we observe within it some degree 
of a transformation of human beings which we cannot help regarding as wholly 
good and profoundly desirable; and we affirm the Real as the ultimate source 
of this transforming power. But all this constitutes a circle of faith-a circle that 
we are, I believe, rationally entitled to stand in even though we cannot establish 
it by external evidences or proofs. 
David Basinger's article is, in my view, a very helpful constructive contribu-
tion. There is only one sentence, in which he characterizes the pluralistic sugges-
tion as being 'that the basic claims of at least all the major world religions are 
more or less accurate descriptions of the same reality,' that J would wish to 
amend to avoid misunderstanding: not 'descriptions of the same reality' but 
'descriptions of different manifestations of the same reality.' But Basinger's 
fuller account of the pluralist hypothesis later in his paper is accurate and balanced. 
Basinger's argument seems to me to be correct. It is evident that the contem-
porary Reformed epistemologists, headed by Alvin Plantinga, tend to be theolog-
ically extremely conservative and probably strongly inclined towards an 
exclusivist theology of religions. But nevertheless this type of epistemology does 
not logically require a conservative or exclusivist theology. The idea that we are 
rationally entitled to believe what our experience-including our religious experi-
ence-induces us to believe, seems to me to be correct. (It is a position that I 
have advocated from Faith and Knowledge, 1957, onwards). But-and this is 
an additional consideration to Basinger's-we have to distinguish between, on 
the one hand, basic beliefs such as the belief that I see a tree, or that I remember 
having had breakfast, or that I am in the presence of God, and on the other hand 
secondary interpretive theories such as that Jesus had two distinct natures, or 
that the Christian awareness of God is the only authentic awareness of God. 
These latter are theological theories which exceed the range of properly basic 
beliefs directly grounded in our experience. They are optional theories about 
those properly basic beliefs; and different optional theories are always available. 
Thus whilst the epistemologist of religion can adopt conservative and exclusivist 
theological theories, she is not obliged to do so. She may prefer a different 
theology, taking fuller account of the scientific study of the scriptures, modem 
knowledge of Christian origins, and the wealth of information that is available 
today concerning the history of religions. It would indeed be a great pity if what 
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is today called the Refonned epistemology were thought to be exclusively Cal-
vinist and to require a sixteenth century set of theological ideas to go with it. I 
hope that Basinger's argument may lessen the hold of Calvinist influence upon 
the theologically neutral topics of epistemology. 
There is much of interest and value in Paul Griffiths' article. But when he 
comes to discuss my writings he seems to be gripped by a polemical spirit which 
leads to misrepresentation. I can readily believe that this is due to a noble 
enthusiasm for the truth as he sees it; but unfortunately I now have to use valuable 
space in pointing out these misrepresentations. 
Griffiths thinks that I hold that the ultimate reality can be correctly characterized 
in mutually incompatible ways. Thus, he says, 'to take an example from 
Buddhism and Christianity, that ultimate reality must be such that it can be 
characterized both as a set of evanescent instantaneous events connected to one 
another by specifiable causes but without any substantial independent existence, 
and as an eternal changeless divine personal substance' (p. 413). On the view 
that Griffiths is (surely rightly) here rejecting, the ultimate reality has all the 
characteristics which the different religions ascribe to the objects of their worship 
or meditation. It is accordingly personal and non-personal, triune and unitary, 
active and not active, changing and unchanging, and so on. As Griffiths says, 
'While it may not be impossible to construct some picture of ultimate reality 
which meets these demands, it is far from easy to see how it might be done' (p. 
413). However I have not attempted any such feat, and I am indeed even less 
sanguine than Griffiths that it could be done. He shows a half awareness of this 
when in the next paragraph he speaks of 'a bow in the direction of ineffability' 
and then of 'a fundamental distinction between [the Real] as it is an sich and as 
it is apprehended by us' (p. 413). But he has not seen the relevance of this 
distinction-which is fundamental to the pluralist hypothesis-to the question 
of incompatible attributes. The Real an sich does not have incompatible proper-
ties. On the contrary, it lies beyond the scope of our (other than purely fonnal) 
human concepts. But it is humanly thought, experienced and responded to in 
tenns of a wide variety of religious concepts. Thus it is conceived and experienced 
from within the Christian tradition as a triune deity; from within the Islamic 
tradition as a unitary deity; from within Mahayana Buddhism as the non-personal 
Dharmakaya, and so on. The incompatible characteristics are not attributed to 
the same object, the Real an sich, but are distributed among its different manifes-
tations within the different streams of religious experience and thought, con-
stituting the great world faiths. 
Again, it is incorrect to suggest that the pluralistic hypothesis, holding that 
salvation takes place within all the world religions, entails 'that there be no 
substantive conflicts among the truth claims of those traditions' (p. 414). I have 
discussed many such conflicts. But they cease to be a matter of religious life 
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and death when we accept that one who knows God as the Holy Trinity need 
not deny that a Muslim knows God equally authentically and salvifically as 
Allah, or a Jew as Adonai; and that a theist, who experiences the Real in 
personalistic terms, need not deny that an advaitic Hindu experiences the Real 
equally authentically and salvifically in non-personalistic terms. The different 
and incompatible beliefs remain, but they are beliefs about different and perhaps 
equally salvific manifestations of the Real. 
Griffiths says that 'The thrust of the position is to remove the need for excluding 
as false or inadequate any doctrine-expressing sentence of significance to any 
community' (p. 414). However the basic criterion that I have advocated in a 
number of places is soteriological. A religious tradition has value to the extent 
that it constitutes an effective context for the salvific transformation of human 
existence from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness. This transformation is 
recognized by its visible fruits in individuals and societies. I have argued that 
the great world religions recognize these fruits with a basically common criterion 
of love/compassion/unselfish good will-a criterion which readily excludes such 
movements as the Jim Jones cult or, as a larger and more terrible phenomenon, 
Nazism. 
Whether 'all the major world religions ... are equally effective in mediating 
religious reality and in transforming for the better the lives of those who adhere 
to them' (p. 413) is not a matter to be settled a priori but on the basis of historical 
investigation. I have suggested that we do not in fact have sufficient information 
for more than the tentative negative conclusion that we lack any good ground 
to claim that one of the great world traditions has been more soteriologically 
effective than another. 
Finally, it seems to me highly inappropriate to describe my own position as 
'a priori pluralism.' It is an hypothesis arrived at inductively to explain the 
phenomena of the varied religiou'l life of humanity. Starting with the stream of 
religious experience and thought in which one participates, and making the basic 
judgment of faith that this constitutes a response (obviously a culturally con-
ditioned response) to a transcendent divine reality, one then extends that judgment 
to the other major world religions, reasoning that because they show comparable 
spiritual fruits they too must be presumed to be (differently culturally conditioned) 
responses to the ultimate divine reality. One then looks for a hypothesis to make 
sense of these data; and the result, in my own mind, is a pluralistic theory hinging 
upon the distinction between the Real in itself and the Real as variously humanly 
conceived and experienced. 
Joseph Runzo, in his valuable article, offers three criticisms of the pluralistic 
hypothesis. He suggests, first, that it 'fails to adequately account for the necessary, 
central role of cognition in religious faith' (p. 353), because it is religious beliefs 
that in each case define a specific path of salvation. I can see no reason, however, 
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why a pluralist should want to deny that the different ways of salvation are 
defined by their respective associated belief-systems. What the pluralist wishes 
to add is that there is a plurality of such ways of salvation, each defined by its 
own set of doctrines. Thus beliefs do play an important part in the religious 
life--there could be no religious life without at least a certain minimal body of 
beliefs. But nevertheless a pluralist will want to insist that no one of the doctrinal 
systems taught by the great traditions is such that it is essential for salvation that 
one believe that system. 
Second, he sees it as a defect of the pluralistic theory that it does not regard 
the Real in itself as a personal deity, as Christianity teaches. It suggests rather 
that the Real an sich lies beyond the scope of our (other than purely formal) 
concepts, including the concepts of personality and impersonality; although it is 
authentically (i.e., salvifically) experienced by many human persons as a cosmic 
super-person. Thus pluralism does not deny the authenticity of the Christian 
experience of a personal God; but it adds that the Ultimate Reality which we 
experience in personal terms is also authentically experienced from within some 
other religious traditions in non-personal terms. But Runzo is right in pointing 
to this as a departure from traditional Christian teaching, and as constituting a 
real stumbling block for traditionally-minded Christians. Our tradition has how-
ever developed to an extraordinary extent over the centuries and perhaps it may 
come to accommodate the thought that Buddhists, for example, are also respond-
ing, through their own non-personal conceptuality, to the one ultimate Reality. 
Third, Runzo holds that for pluralism God is umeal, a mere phenomenal 
appearance of the Real rather than being the Real an sich. But, as he is aware, 
according to the pluralistic hypothesis the phenomenal manifestations of the 
Real, the divine personae and impersonae, are the noumenal Real as humanly 
experienced in terms of the various conceptual schemas. This seems very similar 
to Runzo's own position. 
Indeed I find it difficult to distinguish Runzo's Relativism from the Pluralism 
from which he wants to separate it. For when he speaks of many divine realities, 
each known through the conceptual schema of a particular tradition, he means 
many phenomenal divine realities. He adds that 'God qua noumenallies "behind," 
so to speak, the possible plurality of real phenomenal divine realities, delimited 
by different monotheistic world-views' (p. 356). Again, he says that 'what is 
putatively experienced is not the noumenal Ultimate Reality, but e.g., the real 
[by which he means the phenomenal or experienced] God of history' (p. 358). 
But is not this precisely the pluralistic hypothesis that he was criticizing? Perhaps, 
however, the difference is that the full pluralistic hypothesis extends to the 
non-theistic forms of religious experience whilst Runzo's relativism only covers 
the monotheisms? It would be helpful if Runzo would clarify the difference 
between pluralism and his own form of relativism. 
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William Alston's qualified defence, in his usual careful manner, of continued 
reliance on the distinctively Christian doxastic practice, despite the impossibility 
of establishing objectively that it is superior to its Buddhist, Jewish, Muslim 
etc. equivalents, seems to me to succeed, given his presuppositions. He assumes 
that there is one and only one true religion, or true set of religious beliefs; and 
since the religion in which we find ourselves (usually by the accident of birth) 
'works' satisfactorily, meeting our spiritual needs and leading us in what we 
take to be the right direction, we should stay with it, adhering to its distinctive 
practices and system of ideas. We can do this even whilst being aware that there 
are people living within each of the other great world faiths who find themselves 
in precisely analogous positions. 
Alston candidly acknowledges that the awareness of religious plurality should 
properly diminish our confidence that our own is the (one and only) true religion. 
I take it that, on the basis of his argument, whilst it is entirely reasonable to 
hold to our own faith, it would not be reasonable to go out and seek to convert 
the rest of the world to it. Thus the practical outcomes of Alston's and the 
pluralist's positions are the same: each believer should, generally speaking, live 
within her or his inherited faith, participating as deeply as possible in its salvific 
path, but at the same time respecting the right of people within other traditions 
to do likewise. 
I would suggest however that the real challenge of religious pluralism for 
Alston is not to his epistemology-which seems, to me at least, to represent the 
right approach to the epistemology of religion,-but to what one might call the 
doxastic exclusivism prompted by his theology. If, as I have argued in my own 
paper, the great world faiths seem to be more or less equally salvifically effective, 
is it satisfactory to hold that one of them thinks truly and the rest falsely about 
the divine reality to which they are all responding with apparently equal success? 
Would it not be more in accordance with what seem to be the facts of the religious 
life of humanity around the globe and across the centuries to suppose that the 
different sets of religious ideas and practices taught by the great world traditions, 
including our own, constitute different but in each case valid ways of conceiving, 
experiencing and responding to the ultimately Real? 
Such a line of thought would perhaps most naturally lead towards a two-level 
epistemology of religion in which we affirm a noumenal divine Reality which 
is humanly understood and experienced as a plurality of divine phenomena. But 
if there are other ways of thinking through the implications of an acceptance of 
the equal salvific effectiveness of Christianity and of the other great world faiths, 
these ought to be produced. 
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